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College of the Holy Cross 
And if one forced him to look at the light itself, wouldn’t 
he have pain in his eyes and escape by turning back 
toward those things he was able to make out, and consider 
them clearer in their very being than the ones pointed out 
to him? 
     – Plato, Republic1 
You don’t want to listen? Listen. You don’t want to know 
where your indifference can again lead you and me at any 
time? I’ll tell you. What happened is of no concern of 
yours because you didn’t know, or were too young, or not 
even born yet? You should have seen, and your youth 
gives you no special privilege, and break with your father. 
      – Jean Améry, At the Mind’s Limits2 
 
Introductory Remarks 
If truth hurts, this is no doubt because it is often enough forced on us. And 
the question as to whether the reception of “nice,” “easy” truths is similarly 
an outcome of coercion negates itself in its very formulation—we do not ask 
“why are things the way they are?” from a feeling of comfort; the plaintiff 
cry of “how, then, shall we live?” does not come to us out of a sense of 
security. Indeed, insofar as truth overtakes us and interrupts the 
conventions of our lives, it occurs to us quite apart from our ordinary desires 
and wants. We are thus faced with a paradox: what claim can truth make on 
a being that “doesn’t need it and doesn’t care about it—since it doesn’t at all 
concern his needs”?3 When one considers that the awareness of truth is 
indexed to lived experience, the paradox is only heightened. 
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 An instance of this paradox haunts the texts contained in Jean Améry’s 
1966 volume At The Mind’s Limits: Contemplations By A Survivor On Auschwitz 
And Its Realities.4 In the final essay of his volume, reacting to Robert 
Mizrahi’s claim that the Shoah “is henceforth the absolute reference point for 
every Jew,”5 Améry holds that, 
I am convinced that not every Jew is capable of thinking out this 
relationship. Only those who have lived through a fate like mine, 
and no one else, can refer their lives to the years 1933-1945. By no 
means do I say this with pride . . . Rather it is with a certain shame 
that I assert my sad privilege and suggest that while the 
catastrophe (Katastrophe) is truly the existential reference point for 
all Jews, only we, the immolated (Geopferten) are able to spiritually 
relive the catastrophic event as it was or fully picture it as it could 
be again.6 
For Améry, even if we would wish to think the relationship between Jews 
and the Shoah, we cannot. And yet, he continues to write: “You don’t want 
to listen? Listen. You don’t want to know. . . ? I’ll tell you.”7 This is the truth 
that Améry’s text forces us to acknowledge. Yet, what are we to make of 
Améry’s defiant tone amidst the seeming impossibility of communicating a 
situation precisely insofar as that situation exceeds the capacities and 
desires/needs of people who were not there? This paradox is, in no way, 
unique to Améry’s corpus. It is the central concern of all attempts to bear 
witness to genocide and its aftermath. If Améry’s rendition is more striking, 
this can only be a result of its extreme and unrelenting character. There is no 
access to Améry’s experience for people absent from the horror. Yet Améry 
continues nonetheless. He is communicating that which, by his own account, 
cannot be communicated. He is forcing the impossible on his readers.8 
 Nor is this all. It is not simply that, in speaking to us, he speaks only to 
the survivors. Améry makes no pretense to addressing all survivors. He 
limits his narrative to those who have (as it were) no recourse to the 
traditions of insight through the names “Jerusalem” and “Athens”. About 
the former, Améry states: “In my deliberations, I am unable to consider Jews 
who are Jews because they are sheltered by tradition. I can speak solely for 
myself—and, even with caution, for contemporaries, probably numbering 
into the millions, whose being Jewish burst upon them with elemental force, 
and who must stand this test without God, without history, without 
messianic-national hope. For them, for me, being a Jew means feeling the 
tragedy of yesterday as an inner oppression.”9 As a Jew whose existential 
induction into the religion came by means of the Nuremberg Laws of 1935, 
Améry credits little to traditional Judaism except for a respect and 
admiration borne from the ability of the Orthodox Jew (along with the 
Christian, and the Marxist) to withstand the inferno of Auschwitz as a result 
of religious (and political) commitments.10 But if traditional Judaism is 
reduced to practical efficacy in extreme situations, this is miles beyond the 
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practical impoverishment of intellectually- and philosophically-minded 
individuals: “In the camp the intellect in its totality declared itself to be 
incompetent”11; “You do not observe dehumanized man committing his 
deeds and misdeeds without having all of your notions of inherent human 
dignity placed in doubt . . . And so I dare to say that we didn’t leave 
Auschwitz wiser and deeper, but we were no doubt smarter.”12 Smarter, 
that is, than to believe that the life of contemplation amounted to anything 
other than a malicious joke in circumstances where individuals can be 
reduced to a zone of indistinction between human and nonhuman.13 Améry 
thus speaks from a place outside of tradition, convention, and 
contemplation. He speaks as an Uberwältigter—one who was overcome. In 
Primo Levi’s parlance, Améry speaks as a drowned person.14 
 We grant all of this. Who are we to do otherwise? We manifestly do 
not live in the camps.15 And we cannot empathize with the man who is 
“plagued by dreams such as that he is no longer living at all, that he was 
sent to the ovens in 1944 and his whole existence since has been imaginary, 
an emanation of the insane wish of a man killed twenty years earlier.”16 
Moreover, our Judaism (if not traditional) is nowise a product of forceful 
coercion, and our intellectual strivings (imperfect as they are) still stir us. 
Are we able to learn from Améry? Is Améry able to teach anything to us? Or 
is the central message of At The Mind’s Limits that, after Auschwitz, 
Jerusalem and Athens are destroyed?17 But even then, can we not inquire 
about what, for Améry, Judaism and philosophy were not—i.e., the ways in 
which they appear in his text under the sign of radical negation? Is it 
impossible to re-collect the fragments of philosophy and Judaism in the 
aftermath of their destruction?18  
 I believe that—far from being impossible or illegitimate—this is exactly 
what Améry’s text can teach us. Levi once wrote that his very public 
argument with Améry (over whether Levi was adopting too forgiving a 
stance towards the Germans) was “forced” upon him by the latter.19 Indeed, 
just as coercive force plagued Améry in life, so is that force—that duress—a 
theme that runs through At The Mind’s Limits, culminating in the final 
essay—which will be the focus of the present study. I will show that 
Améry’s narrative places careful readers under such duress in order to force 
them to return to the very (Jewish and philosophical) sources that are 
negated in Améry’s narrative. If Améry’s text adheres to the negativity 
characteristic of both Sartrean revolt20 and the Adornean (interpretation of 
the Jewish) ban on images/representation,21 it drives these figures past the 
limits that characterize their authors’ thoughts.22 Readers are thus forced to 
recognize (1) an Adornean-style non-identity between themselves and 
Améry’s narrative and (2) that any claim to such an identity would be a 
mark of Sartrean bad faith.23 Being foreigners to Améry’s text, we are 
therefore placed in question.24 Making one’s own return to the sources thus 
constitutes a need for careful readers of Améry.25 Only through such a return 
J e f f r e y  B e r n s t e i n  |  1 9 5  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy | Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXIV, No 3 (2016) | http://www.jffp.org | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2016.795 
can we evaluate whether (1) our Judaism indeed results from anti-Semitic 
construction and (2) whether our continued study of philosophy results 
simply from the missed realization of that life.26 It is my contention that 
Améry’s final text, in At The Mind’s Limits, negatively supplies the fragments 
for his readers to re-collect. The purpose of the present study is not to determine 
this remarkable essay; rather, it is to highlight and explore the moments therein 
where philosophy and Judaism make a forceful return by way of negation. It is to 
begin to force us, as readers, to confront and take up what is precisely renounced by 
Améry at every turn in his essay. It is, finally, to place readers under duress. Or 
better, it is to show readers that Améry’s duress is (in a different way) our own. If 
the narrative style I adopt is, thus, fragmented—if the notes dealing with 
philosophy and Jewish thought provide little in the manner of context—this 
is because Améry’s text describes and registers the complete collapse of 
context with respect to philosophy and Judaism; the other side to Améry’s 
forcing a re-collection is the fragmentation of explanation about the 
fragments that are in need of re-collection. The present study, therefore, 
registers the shattered character made manifest in a close reading of 
Améry’s essay. 
 
The Essay’s Title and ‘Being a Jew (Jude zu sein)’ 
For decades, English-language readers of Améry’s collection have been 
treated to an elegant final essay entitled “On The Necessity and 
Impossibility of Being a Jew.” Its logical symmetry alone raises important 
questions of a general nature about the difficulties of being Jewish after 
Auschwitz (or, perhaps, even after after-Auschwitz). It would indeed be 
difficult to improve on the refined quality of the translation. We can only 
note that, as a translation, it obscures more than it makes clear about 
Améry’s essay—especially concerning our present purposes. Differently 
stated, translating the title as “necessity” situates the essay in the very 
philosophical terrain that ultimately needs to be recovered. For Améry does 
not have in mind the “Notwendigkeit” that refers, above all else, to 
Heidegger.27 Still less is he referring to the borrowed Latinate “Necessität” 
that, despite the twists and turns of multiple translations, is ultimately 
indexed to the two main sub-definitions of ‘necessity’ (understood as what 
cannot be otherwise) in Aristotle—i.e., “that without which a joint cause of a 
thing cannot live” and “[t]hose without which the good cannot be or come to 
be, or those without which we cannot get rid of or be deprived of the evil”.28 
Only the third sub-definition expresses Améry’s intent: “[t]he compulsory, 
or force”29—and this is exactly why he uses the word Zwang (i.e., forced 
compulsion, coercion, constraint). In order to better express the distance 
between Améry’s conception, on one hand, and the philosophical horizon 
that the other definitions inhabit, I translate Zwang (following Pierre Joris’s 
translation of Celan) as ‘duress’.30 What my rendering lacks in elegance as 
“On the Duress and Impossibility of Being a Jew” (hereafter, “Duress”), I 
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hope it makes up for it by capturing the forced and forcing quality of Améry’s 
text. 
 Despite the fact that Améry’s text is deeply beholden to Anti-Semite 
and Jew, Améry remarkably begins “Duress” with a repudiation of a crucial 
Sartrean tenet late in that book—i.e., “In effect, the Jew is to another Jew the 
only man with whom he can say ‘we’.”31 “Not seldom,” Améry writes, 
“when in conversation my partner draws me into a plural—that is, as soon 
as he includes my person in whatever connection and says to me: ‘We 
Jews…’—I feel a not exactly tormenting, but nonetheless deep-seated 
discomfort.”32 Améry’s discomfort is not the result of Jewish ‘self-hatred’—
that is, of not wanting to be Jewish; rather, he says, he cannot be one. At the 
same time, he is forced to be one by society: “And I do not merely submit to 
this duress (Zwang), but expressly claim it as part of my person. The duress 
(Zwang) and impossibility of being a Jew, that is what causes me indistinct 
pain.”33 Rather than disclosing solidarity (even in an ‘inauthentic’ sense), the 
plural nominative sets Améry apart from his co-religionists. That he is 
forced into identity with them by German society (and, as Améry claims, the 
entire world) does not change the negative affective charge (i.e., deep-seated 
discomfort, indistinct pain) that Améry experiences over the concrete 
instantiation of Sartre’s claim.  
What, for Améry, does it mean to ‘be a Jew’? From the outset, we learn 
that it requires neither religious identity nor cultural heritage associated 
with the Jewish religion: “I don’t believe in the God of Israel. I know very 
little about Jewish culture. I see myself as a boy at Christmas, plodding 
through a snow-covered village to midnight mass; I don’t see myself in a 
synagogue. I hear myself appealing to Jesus, Mary, and Joseph when a 
minor household misfortune occurred; I hear no adjuration of the Lord in 
Hebrew.”34 Still less does it spring from the freedom that Sartre bestows on 
Jews: “Jewish authenticity consists in choosing oneself as a Jew—that is, in 
realizing one’s Jewish condition . . . He chooses his brothers and peers.”35 
Améry’s response: “[D]o I really have [the freedom to choose]? I don’t 
believe so . . . One can re-establish the link with a tradition that one has lost, 
but one cannot freely invent it for oneself, that is the problem. Since I was not 
a Jew, I am not one; and since I am not one, I won’t be able to become one.”36 In 
good Aristotelian fashion, Améry indicates the temporal causality leading to 
the creation and transmission of religion. Lacking the necessary causes for 
such creation and transmission, one lacks the requirements for Judaism to 
come into being in a person.37 Or, in language at once more Hegelian, more 
Nietzschean, and more Freudian, Améry holds that “To be who one is by 
becoming the person one should be and wants to be: for me this dialectical 
process of self-realization is obstructed. Because being something, not as 
metaphysical essence, but as simple summation of one’s early experience, 
absolutely has priority. Everyone must be who he was in the first years of 
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his life, even if later these were buried under. No one can become what he 
cannot find in his memories.”38 
If Améry, therefore, is neither the (inauthentic) Jew who (passively) 
speaks in the plural nominative, nor the (authentic) Jew who chooses his 
Jewishness, what kind of Jew is he? He is a Jew by virtue of his being forced 
to be one. Although this only emerges in its full extremity in the Nuremburg 
Laws, Améry prefigures this scene for us when he speaks of the reactions his 
neighbors had to his mixed family background.39 ‘Being a Jew’, for Améry, 
is a condition one finds oneself in as a result of duress. We have little 
wonder, therefore, over his explanation for his essay: “It is with this duress 
(Zwang), this impossibility, this oppression, this inability that I must deal 
here, and in doing so I can only hope, without certainty, that my individual 
story is exemplary enough also to reach those who neither are nor have to be 
Jews.”40 Put differently, while ‘being a Jew’ cannot be positively grasped 
without having been through the camps, it can be approached negatively (i.e., 
‘without certainty,’ only to be ‘reached’). As indicated earlier, this amounts 
(intentionally or not) to an instance of the Adornean methodological ban on 
images. This, however, in no way prevents us from recognizing the distance 
between Améry’s narrative path and our own.  
At moments, Améry’s negativity seems to risk throwing him into 
doubt about his own narrative identity:  
Thus I am not permitted to be a Jew. But since all the same I must 
be one and since this compulsion excludes the possibilities that 
might allow me to be something other than a Jew, can I not find 
myself at all? . . . Since the duress (Zwang) exists—and how 
compelling it is!—perhaps the impossibility can be resolved. After 
all, one wants to live without hiding, as I did when I was in the 
underground, and without dissolving into the abstract. A human 
being? Certainly, who would not want to be one. But you are a 
human being only if you are a German, a Frenchman, a Christian, a 
member of whatever identifiable social group. I must be a Jew and 
will be one, with or without religion, within or outside a tradition.41 
‘Being a Jew’, therefore, is an individual—perhaps radically singular—
experience. It depends on no tradition or social group. And it is far more 
concrete than the thrownness of which Heidegger speaks insofar as it 
involves being forced into a situation by others. Given Améry’s strong 
identification with French culture despite his not ‘being French’, one cannot 
help but recall (via juxtaposition) a French thinker who (when not narrating 
about a country foreign to his own) wrote elegantly about the relation of 
individuals to collectives: “Our fathers did not have the word individualism, 
which we have forged for our own use, because in their day there was no 
such thing as an individual who did not belong to a group and could see 
himself as standing absolutely alone.”42 In one respect, therefore, ‘being a 
1 9 8  |  A m é r y ’ s  D u r e s s  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy | Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXIV, No 3 (2016) | http://www.jffp.org | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2016.795 
Jew’ is a fundamentally modern phenomenon. However, as described 
centuries earlier by a Jewish poet living in Spain, it is also the condition of 
the philosopher.43  
 At any rate, the full awareness of his being a Jew under duress begins 
in 1935:  
I was sitting over a newspaper in a Vienna coffeehouse and was 
studying the Nuremburg Laws, which had just been enacted across 
the border in Germany. I needed only to skim them and already I 
could perceive that they applied to me. Society concretized in the 
National Socialist German state, which the world recognized 
absolutely as the legitimate representative of the German people, 
had just made me formally and beyond any question a Jew, or 
rather it had given a new dimension to what I had already known 
earlier, but which at the time was of no great consequence to me, 
namely, that I was a Jew . . . I am sure certain that in that year, at 
that moment when I read the Laws, I did indeed already hear the 
death threat—better, the death sentence—and certainly no special 
sensitivity toward history was required for that.44  
The condition of ‘being a Jew’ needed no special attunement to history,45 no 
metamorphosis in outward appearance: “After I had read the Nuremburg 
Laws, I was no more Jewish than half an hour before.”46 All it required was 
that society, hitherto largely uninterested in Améry, openly and uniformly 
deem him to be a Jew. It required that the famous Sartrean dictum be 
actualized—the anti-Semites had finally invented the Jew.47 
The consequences of this invention are, for Améry, clear and striking: 
“To be a Jew, that meant for me, from this moment on, to be a dead man on 
leave, someone to be murdered, who only by chance was not yet where he 
properly belonged; and so it has remained, in many variations, in various 
degrees of intensity, until today.”48 We should note that the extreme 
character of ‘being a Jew’ is due, in large measure, to the classical 
determination of ‘chance’ as given by Aristotle—i.e., a coming-together of 
indefinite causes that produce a certain result.49 ‘Being a Jew’ thus entails an 
enforced societal individualization, the death of which is primary, and the 
living of which is accidental. Yet even the fear of death was not, for Améry, 
the most extreme character of ‘being a Jew’. Rather, it was the process of 
degradation and the concomitant loss of dignity occurring as both its most 
immediate and long-ranging effect that discloses the ultimate horror of this 
condition.  
 
Degradation and Dignity 
Beginning his discussion of the degradation of Jews, Améry fully 
acknowledges both his own debt to Sartre and the limitations of that debt: 
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“Jean-Paul Sartre, already in 1946 in his book Anti-Semite and Jew, offered a 
few perceptions that are still valid today. There is no ‘Jewish Problem,’ he 
said, only a problem of anti-Semitism; the anti-Semite forced the Jew into a 
situation in which he permitted his enemy to stamp him with a self-image. 
Both points appear to me to be unassailable. But . . . Sartre could not 
describe the total, crushing pressure (Pression) of anti-Semitism . . . [nor 
could he] comprehend it in its entire overwhelming might (Kraft) . . . [I]n the 
years of the Third Reich the Jew stood with his back to the wall, and it too 
was hostile. There was no way out . . . All of Germany—but what am I 
saying!—the whole world nodded its head in approval of the 
undertaking.”50 Notable in this passage are two moments: First, while Sartre 
grasps the dialectical relation between anti-Semite and Jew (i.e., that the Jew 
exists because the anti-Semite invents him), he fails to fully appreciate the 
extent to which the anti-Semitic character of Germany—with the tacit or 
explicit approval of the rest of the world—robbed the Jew of precisely the 
freedom that would allow Sartre to state that “[t]he moment [the Jew] ceases 
to be passive, he takes away all power and all virulence from anti-
Semitism.”51 While Améry will eventually grant a certain moderate amount 
of such freedom in his discussion of revolt, it remains the case that such 
freedom amounted to impotence in the face of the Third Reich. Second, 
Améry’s image of the Jew “standing with his back to the wall” cannot help 
but remind us (in the context of the present study) of Plato’s parable of the 
Cave. This reminder, however, explicitly takes the form of a negative 
movement: In the Cave parable, the cave-dwellers innocently walk along the 
wall and see shadows until they are (mysteriously) freed to make an ascent 
(however difficult it may be) to light.52 In sharp contrast, a cosmopolitan and 
en-light-ened society descends into one of the darkest periods of world 
history in which the Jews are (at best) restrained, (more often) menaced, and 
with the ultimate aim being to show Jews that “our sole right, our sole duty, 
was to eliminate ourselves from the world (uns selber aus der Welt zu 
schaffen).”53 This is the near-logical conclusion to a process of daily 
indoctrination that held that Jews were “lazy, evil, ugly, capable only of 
misdeed, clever only to the extent that we pulled one over on others . . . Our 
hideous faces, depraved and spoilt by protruding ears and hanging noses, 
were disgusting to our fellow men, fellow citizens of yesterday. We were not 
worthy of love and thus also not of life.”54 Little wonder then, as Améry 
notes, that the suicide rate of Viennese Jews showed an increase.55 At the 
point where “the brightest and most upright Jewish minds, authentic or 
inauthentic, capitulated to Streicher’s anti-Semitic image of Jews in Der 
Stürmer],” Germany had become one large cave containing a “wall of 
rejection.”56 
 Améry again stresses that there was a direct path from the Nuremberg 
Laws to the camps.57 The Nuremberg Laws, in spelling out the judgment 
against Jews, contained within it (in protean form) all the actualities of 
Auschwitz, Treblinka and Bergen-Belsen. And we again see the negation of 
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the classically construed ascent from darkness to light. In a context 
chronologically closer to Améry, one thinks (with some trepidation) of 
Schelling’s famous statement: “All birth is birth from darkness into light; the 
seed kernel must be sunk into the earth and die in the darkness so that the 
more beautiful shape of light may lift and unfold itself in the radiance of the 
sun.”58 Adorno supplies the speculative negation of this view: “No universal 
history leads from savagery to humanitarianism, but there is one leading 
from the slingshot to the megaton bomb.”59 Améry’s response is at once less 
general than Adorno’s and more saturated with negativity. For him, the 
descent into degradation leads to his attempt at “the reattainment of 
dignity.” This aim accompanies Améry for the rest of his life, is at the basis 
of his revolt against society, and (one assumes) lay unfulfilled for the rest of 
his life. It certainly lay unfulfilled at the writing of “Duress”: “For me, until 
today, this is not completed (ist . . . nicht abgeschlossen).”60 Primo Levi is not 
incorrect to hold that, for Améry, the concepts of identity and dignity 
“coincide.”61 Yet we also must not understate the importance of life as well:  
If I was correct that the deprivation of dignity was nothing other 
than the potential deprivation of life, then dignity would have to be 
the right to live. If it was also correct when I said that the granting 
and depriving of dignity are acts of social agreement . . . so it would 
be senseless to argue against the social body that deprives us of our 
dignity with the claim that we do indeed ‘feel’ worthy . . . It is 
certainly true that dignity can only be bestowed by society . . . Still, 
the degraded person, threatened with death, is able—and here we 
break through the logic of the final sentencing—to convince society 
of his dignity by taking his fate upon himself and at the same time rising 
in revolt against it.62 
If there exists a genuine and unhindered Sartrean moment of freedom in 
Améry, it is here. Améry’s statement coincides with Sartre’s view that 
“Jewish authenticity consists in choosing oneself as Jew—that is, in realizing 
one’s Jewish condition.”63 For Améry, this realization amounts to nothing 
less than taking the entire weight of National-Socialist degradation and 
world indifference and—in the language of Kierkegaard—concentrating it 
into “one act of consciousness.”64 This “act (Akt),” involves “the absolute 
(uneingeschränkte) recognition that the verdict of the social group is a given 
reality.”65 Were this act of consciousness to terminate in the simple 
acceptance of societal reality, however, Améry’s experience would more 
closely resemble Kierkegaard’s Knight of Infinite Resignation than what 
actually transpired—i.e., it would amount to the simple acceptance of fate; it 
would amount to “flee[ing] before [the death sentence] by withdrawing into 
interiority (Innerlichkeit) [and] would have been nothing but a disgrace.”66 In 
sharp contrast, and much like the Knight of Faith who irrationally gains the 
love of the woman who simultaneously rejects him, Améry’s act leads him 
in a direction equally as improbable. For he also understood that “while I 
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had to accept the verdict as such, I could compel (zwingen) the world to 
revise it. I accepted the judgment of the world, with the decision to 
overcome it through revolt.”67 At first, this revolt takes the form of joining 
the resistance. In the camps, however, it becomes at once more specific, more 
definitive, and more decisive: “I finally relearned what I and my kind often 
had forgotten and what was more crucial than the moral power to resist: to 
hit back.”68 Améry’s account is worth quoting at length: 
Before me I see the prisoner foreman Juszek, a Polish professional 
criminal of horrifying vigor. In Auschwitz he once hit me in the 
face because of a trifle; that is how he was used to dealing with 
Jews under his command. At this moment—I felt it with piercing 
clarity—it was up to me to go a step further in my prolonged 
appeals case against society. In open revolt I struck Juszek in the face 
in turn. My human dignity lay in this punch to his jaw—and that it 
was woefully thrashed, meant nothing to me . . . there are 
situations in life in which our body is our entire I (Ich) and our 
entire fate. I was my body and nothing else . . . My body, when it 
tensed to strike was my physical and metaphysical dignity . . . As 
(als) the punch, I was myself—for myself and for my opponent.69 
The single act of consciousness—the acceptance of societal verdict—thus 
leads Améry to both the semi-concealed revolt of joining the resistance and 
the “open” revolt of striking Juszek. In striking him—in becoming the 
physical act—Améry discovers the long, slow, and never completed process 
of reattaining dignity. Améry notes that he “became a person not by 
subjectively appealing to my abstract humanity but by discovering myself 
within the given social reality as a revolting (revoltierender) Jew and by 
realizing myself as one.”70 Here, the existing English translation of 
“rebelling Jew” fails to do justice to the extremity of Améry’s situation as 
well as to the dialectical character of Améry’s Sartrean conception of revolt. 
If the reattainment of dignity through revolt consists both (1) in the 
recognition of the Jew in the image of Streicher’s characterization (and 
accepted by society) and (2) in the subsequent rising up against that image, 
then Améry can be a ‘Jew in revolt’ only insofar as he takes on the persona of 
a ‘revolting Jew.’ Bleak as this view may be, it is crucial to Améry’s point. 
 Unlike the Kierkegaardian Knight of Faith, Améry’s revolt has no 
fulfillment: “The ordeal (Prozeß), I said, went on and still goes on. At this 
hour (zur Stunde) I have neither won nor lost.”71 Anti-Semitism certainly did 
not end after the war, as Améry had imagined and hoped it would.72 
Moreover, unlike the war years, the physical form of revolt dissipated:  
I could not very well sew on a yellow star without appearing 
foolish or eccentric to myself. There also was no longer any 
opportunity to punch the enemy in his face, for he was not so easy 
to recognize anymore. The reattainment of dignity . . . remained a 
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need (Nötigung) and desire. Except that I had to recognize even 
more clearly than in the days when physical revolt was at least 
possible that I was confronted with duress (zwang) and 
impossibility.73  
For Améry, the wound inflicted on him was now becoming more difficult to 
treat insofar as the infection was becoming more disparate. And this 
difficultly in no way involved his relation to anti-Semitism (which, in any 
case, was a problem only for the anti-Semites), but only his own existence.74 
The question thus transforms from “How can I survive in the camps with 
dignity?” to something like “How can I persevere in the world?” Or, as 
Améry grimly muses, “Often I have asked myself whether one can live 
humanly in the tension between anxiety (Angst) and rage (Zorn).”75 
 
Living as ‘Being a Jew’ 
Up to this point, readers may wonder why I have focused on re-collecting 
fragments of philosophy in Améry’s “Duress” rather than fragments of 
Jewish thought. Certainly Améry’s background, as well as his acceptance of 
the Sartrean construal of Judaism, makes any discussion of traditional 
Jewish sources difficult. However, there is one moment in his essay where 
Améry negatively compels the reader to re-collect almost the entire history 
of a central tenet of Jewish thought. It is to this moment that I now turn as a 
way of discussing the question of what living as ‘being a Jew’ means for 
Améry. 
 In returning to the question of the duress and impossibility of being a 
Jew, Améry makes a remarkable statement—one, to this day, worthy of 
shudder: 
On my left forearm I bear the Auschwitz number; it reads more 
briefly than the Pentateuch or the Talmud and yet provides more 
thorough information. It is also more binding than basic formulas 
of Jewish existence. If to myself and the world, including the 
religious and nationally minded Jews, who do not regard me as one 
of their own, I say: I am a Jew, then I mean by that those realities 
and possibilities that are summed up in the Auschwitz number.76 
It is a harsh statement, to be sure. It is a revolting (again, in both senses of 
the term) assertion of a reality and authenticity born through horror, torture, 
and misery. But it is also more. We glean a sense of how much more, when 
we return to the Scriptural passage (Deuteronomy 6: 5-9) that the passage 
more or less explicitly renounces: 
Hear O Israel! The Lord is our God, the Lord alone. You shall love 
the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and 
with all your might. Take to heart these instructions with which I 
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charge you this day. Impress them upon your children. Recite them 
when you stay at home and when you are away, when you lie 
down and when you get up. Bind them as a sign upon your hand 
and let them serve as a symbol on your forehead; inscribe them on 
the doorposts of your house and on your gates.77 
I believe we should not err by over-valuing the first sentences of this passage 
(dealing with God) in relation to Améry’s text. As a non-believer, the 
question of God is a non-issue for him. Nor is personal belief in God the 
cornerstone of Judaism. It is, in fact, the other sentences in the passage that 
Améry’s text devastates. In holding that the number inscribed into his arm 
both provides more useful information than the Pentateuch or Talmud, and 
is more binding than basic formulas of Jewish existence, Améry is taking 
aim not simply at the connection between Judaism and divinity. Rather, he 
is calling into question Judaism as a transmissible tradition. The 
Deuteronomic passage—the central prayer in all Jewish services—speaks not 
only of ‘information’ to which Jews ought to adhere but also registers the 
need of, and highlights the modes of, handing down Judaism to future 
generations. The laying of tefillin (i.e., wearing of phylacteries) and the 
posting of mezuzot (parchments inscribed with traditional religious Jewish 
texts and attached inside a case) on the doors of houses bears witness to 
Judaism as a living tradition—one that responds by means of interpretation 
to the circumstances inhabited by Jews. We might consider only the most 
prominent examples of this: For the medieval Rabbinic commentators Rashi 
and Nahmanides, the inscription of Judaism, by means of the mezuzah, 
referred to the marking of a communal space for Judaism.78 Samson Raphael 
Hirsch (writing in the 19th century both in reaction to, but also as a product 
of Enlightenment liberalism), extends this reference to both 
public/communal and private/individual spaces.79 The rabbinic persona 
Abba bar Alihu (drawing on Proverbs 6:22) homiletically describes the 
mezuzah as a guardian of Jewish life.80 Finally, the Zohar interprets the 
Deuteronomic passage as being directly (if esoterically) indexed to the Ten 
Commandments81--they therefore have a direct connection to the ethical, 
legal, and political roots upon which Jewish life becomes intelligible. 
 As a result of Améry’s experiences in the camps, culminating in the 
tattoo forced on him in Auschwitz, this entire constellation is negated. 
Améry, of course, does not claim that it is negated for all Jews. By bringing 
to our attention the extreme possibility present in the camps, however, we 
are compelled to wonder how we would fare in the camps. Améry’s 
negation calls into question even the efficacy of the very narrative of 
transmission undergirding the connection of the Written Law of the Torah 
with the Oral Law that would eventually come to constitute the Talmud.82 If 
one reflects on the foundational character of this transmission-narrative (i.e., 
for diasporic communities over the past two millennia), one gleans the 
radicality of Améry’s otherwise laconic statement. The character of this 
2 0 4  |  A m é r y ’ s  D u r e s s  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy | Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXIV, No 3 (2016) | http://www.jffp.org | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2016.795 
negation is, quite simply, inversion. Rather than the inscription guarding the 
Jewish people by reminding them of the Jewish law, the inscribed number in 
Auschwitz amounts to a reminder of the law of the camps requiring 
individual and collective servitude to the guard. In sharp contrast to the 
imperative to teach generations a series of commandments leading to an 
intelligible manner of living, the Auschwitz number inscribes a punishment 
(in similar fashion to Kafka’s “In the Penal Colony”) the intelligible character 
of which extends no farther than showing the prisoners that they are literally 
marked for death. And instead of transmitting a teaching to future generations 
in the manner of a vibrant and living tradition that activates both body and 
mind, the number singularizes one into a mute object—a passive recipient, a 
pin cushion. These, for Améry, are “the realities and possibilities that are 
summed up in the Auschwitz number.” They are at once more concrete and 
more delusional than “the basic formulas of Jewish existence.” Yet Améry 
has succeeded in helping us re-collect the very tradition that he has negated; 
he has not negated that tradition for us because we do not have the 
experience of the camps. Is this intentional? We are not told and, therefore, 
we cannot be sure. However, it is clear that, after a certain point in his life, 
Améry himself was at least somewhat aware of the tradition he negates. 
Why then is he not able to re-collect it for himself?  
 Here we return to issues of a more philosophical character. At this 
point, Améry concerns himself with the question as to how existence can or 
ought to be defined. “It does not matter,” he holds, “whether an existence 
can be positively defined”83. Already, then, we see that Améry’s inability to 
re-collect the Jewish tradition stems from his renunciation of a certain mode 
of definition. If a negative definition of existence is equally as good as a 
positive definition, then the entire tradition of Jewish thought is (in the 
language of Aristotle) accidental. Again we return to the Sartrean horizon (if 
with a small modification): “[E]ven if the others do not decide that I am a 
Jew . . . I am still a Jew by the mere fact that the world around me does not 
expressly designate me as a non-Jew. To be something can mean that one is not 
something else.”84 Despite the fact that Améry clearly accepts the Sartrean 
distinction by which existence precedes essence, he has—with the force of a 
lightning-bolt—negatively supplied us with the Aristotelian conception of 
‘essence’: “things which are not said of other subjects I call ‘essential,’ but 
things which are said of other subjects I call ‘attributes.’”85 Following him, 
Maimonides articulates it in a manner of which Améry’s statement is a clear 
echo: “The characteristic by which one species may be recognized and 
differentiated from another and which constitutes its essence is called 
difference . . . It is fitting that we investigate in this manner every species 
until we know its constitutive difference.”86 In construing the condition of 
‘being a Jew’ negatively — “as a non-non-Jew, I am a Jew”87 — Améry’s 
thinking remains indexed to the classical conception of essence as 
constitutive difference. But (as intimated earlier), if the essence of ‘being a Jew’ 
is contained in the definition ‘non-non-Jew’, this in no way supplies Améry 
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with any need to return (once again? for the first time?) to any positive 
determination of Judaism. In the end, Améry is left with a Judaism formed 
under duress:  
[S]ince being a Jew not only means that I bear within me a 
catastrophe that occurred yesterday and cannot be ruled out for 
tomorrow, it is—beyond being a task (Aufgabe)—also fear. Every 
morning when I get up I can read the Auschwitz number on my 
forearm, something that touches the deepest and most closely 
intertwined roots of my existence; indeed, I am not sure if this is 
not my entire existence . . . every day anew I lose my trust in the 
world . . . The Jew without positive determinants, the catastrophe 
Jew, as we will unhesitatingly call him, must get along without 
trust in the world.”88 As a Jew lacking trust in the world, a 
perpetual foreigner,89 Améry finds little connection between 
himself and other Jews: “it is time to testify how I related to my 
kinsmen, the Jews. But are they really related to me after all?”90 
With this, we have come full circle. Améry finds that the constitution of a 
plural nominative for the catastrophe Jew is problematic because it 
references no positive determinations: “With Jews as Jews, I share practically 
nothing.”91 In the end, Améry finds such constitution in the “solidarity in 
the face of threat . . . the solidarity of revolt”92—i.e., the link that one 
catastrophe Jew shares with another based on shared horror, misery, and 
knowledge of the extreme possibilities contained in being a Jew: “I can be a 
Jew only in anxiety (Angst) and rage (Zorn), when—in order to attain 
dignity, anxiety transforms itself into rage.”93 We have come full circle as 
well concerning the Deuteronomic passage that, as we said, forms the 
central prayer of Judaism—Sh’ma Yisrael (‘Hear O Israel’): “‘Hear, O Israel’ is 
not my concern. Only a ‘Hear, O World’ wants ragefully (zornig) to break out 
from within me. The six-digit number on my forearm demands it. That is 
what the awareness of catastrophe, the dominant force of my existence 
requires.”94 For Améry, ‘being a Jew’ bears with it a rage at the past, present, 
and future indifference of the world. Rather than being a post-
Enlightenment thinker, Améry is in fact the negative image of the 
Enlightenment universalism put forward by Kant. Like Adorno and 
(differently) Sartre, Améry’s form of radical enlightenment amounts to a 
radicalization of the critical spirit of the Enlightenment. 
 
Conclusion 
Remembering that we are neither children of the camps nor children of the 
assimilation (as it occurred in 19th and 20th century Germany), we are 
tempted to raise the paradoxical Adornean question at the heart of what he 
calls ‘metaphysical experience’: “Can this be all?”95 Even Adorno 
acknowledges the inevitability of this question. Even if the expectation of an 
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answer to this question amounts to a “waiting in vain,” it nonetheless 
remains true that “nothing could be experienced as truly alive if something 
that transcends life were not promised also; no straining of the concepts 
leads beyond that. The transcendent is and it is not. We despair of what is, 
and our despair spreads to the transcendental ideas that used to call a halt to 
despair.”96 I believe that Améry’s “Duress” performs this dialectic of 
‘transcendence’ as well as any text of the twentieth and twenty-first century. 
In showing (by way of negation) the extreme limit that faces both 
philosophy and Judaism, Améry’s text (in the manner of Spinoza’s Ethics 
and Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit) sends us right back to the beginning in 
order to re-collect those traditions for ourselves.  
 This is not to suggest that Améry promises redemption through this 
return—Améry’s texts hold no comfort for readers. His essays on the camps 
and their horrific aftermath sound the warning bell about the manner in 
which human dignity becomes lost and in which it may yet become lost 
again. Moreover, this extreme possibility evinces a notable indifference to 
political form and organization. Yet, in his radical negation of Judaism and 
philosophy, Améry succeeds in transmitting to his readers moments in both 
traditions—this despite or because of the growing historical distance from 
the Nazi catastrophe in which such readers find themselves. He certainly 
was unable to provide for himself that which was closed off to his own 
past—i.e., a transhistorical horizon in which he could find solace. But 
although one can only construe his own life as a species of hell, the urgent 
provocations contained in his writings may yet constitute for his 
posthumous readership—in however attenuated a way—something like a 
blessing.97 
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